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prodigiously. Put simply, it is being argued that
Heidegger (a) provides an analysis and diagnosis of
Western thought and culture, and a critique of modem
technology, which taken together allow us to understand
why we are faced with the present environmental crisis,
and (b) that he shows ways of drawing upon different
possibilities inherent in Western thought and cultureasking us neither to take up the practice of Taoism, nor
to embmce Native American cosmogonies-that would
lead to a far more salutary relation between humankind
and the natural world. And although there have been
historic tensions between the "deep ecology" and
"animal rights" emphases in environmental ethics, any
views prescribing a fundamental alteration in our
relation to the natural environment must still be assumed
prima facie to hold important implications for our
treatment of animals.
Working from this latter point of view, I shall today
argue ftrst, that rather than neglecting the subject,
Heidegger's thinking offers us the elements for an
alternative understanding ofethics that is especially well
suited to the task of fmding better ways of getting along
with other residents of this planet. Second, I shall
maintain that although Heidegger offers no speciftc
prescriptions regarding our treatment of animals, there
are some things that we can extrapolate from his
writings with conftdence. Third, I shall propose that
Heidegger's work provides us with a good occasion to

At ftrst glance, the work of Martin Heidegger would
seem to be an unlikely source for ethical reflection on
our relation to animals. First, it has long been regarded
as problematical that Heidegger-whose work seems
otherwise to have a comprehensive scope-did not write
an "ethics" in the modem sense of the term, Le., did
not arrive at a theory of moral obligation on the model
of Kant or Mill or his own compatriot and early animal
rights advocate, Leonard Nelson. Second, Heidegger's
published works-including his recently published
lectures, lecture courses, and seminars in the German
Collected Works-say virtually nothing about how
animals in particular ought to be treated. Third, when
he does discuss animals, his purpose is usually to argue
vigorously for a fundamental difference between them
and human beings, even maintaining that there is an
ontological "abyss" between humans and animals.
There is, however, a countervailing consideration.
Although his writings are not often actually read within
the fteld, Heidegger has begun to be cited so often in
the literature of deep ecology that he may be said to
have attained a semi-canonical status, and the interestand secondary literature-in the relation between
Heidegger and deep ecology are beginning to prolifemte
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for example, that we translate as truth is a-letheia:
rendered literally, un-concealment or un-hiddenness,
implying that prior to the onset of Greek philosophy
and the metaphysics of presence, a primacy of
hiddenness and concealment was acknowledged. Truth
as unconcealment is always wrested away from a prior
hiddenness (whether it be that of error, dissemblance,
or oblivion) to which it is destined as well to return.
Before, after, and in the midst of presence and clarity
and intelligibility, Heidegger maintains, lies recalcitrance, withdrawal, darkness, mystery.
But does this not prove that Heidegger's critics are
right in branding him a mystagogue and irrationalist?
On the contrary, it calls for all the greater vigilance on
the part of reason (that it not be seduced unknowingly
by unreason) and passion in the quest for truth (that it
must always again be fought for and won). Like Kant,
Heidegger seeks to limit and define (rather than bound
and restrict) reason and intelligibility; but whereas Kant
fixed the recalcitrance of being in the noumenal realm,
Heidegger wants us to note how it seeps into every kind
of clarity and overtness-to see that overtness is never
total and explanation is never final, that mountains and
people and rivers and animals are always more than
what we make them out to be-and more than what we
wish to make of them as well. Entities are always more
than the uses we fmd for them, more than the lucidity
of theory can reveal, more than experience can exhaust,
and this is so not as a matter of fact but necessarily,
inevitably. This view prescribes, if you will, a sort of
ontological humility in the face of the integrity of
beings, an ontological deference toward their resistance
to being reduced to our knowledge of them and our
uses for them, and above all their resistance to that allencompassing network of supply and regulation that is
modern technology. Heidegger's German word for this
comportment which lets entities be what they are, while
at the same time relinquishing the claim of technology
to determine the being of entities, is Gelassenheit.
"We are not dealing here with just any question,"
Socrates tells Glaucon at an important point in Plato's
dialogue on justice, "but with the question of how life
is to be lived." If we understand ethics not in its
narrower, modern sense-as a theory of moral
obligation-but in this broader sense of the ancientsas reflection on how life as a whole is to be livedthen Heidegger's Gelassenheit is as much an ethic as it
is an epistemology. Gelassenheit is releasement-a
letting-go that is at the same time a letting-be. Letting-go

question the widely held views that fundamental
distinctions drawn between humans and animals lead
to the mistreatment of animals, and correspondingly,
that maintaining the absence of radical difference is
necessarily conducive to the welfare of animals.

•
,

I. Heidegger's Question of Being and
Its Implications for Ethics
In order to see what kind of ethics might follow from
Heidegger's thought, it is necessary to proceed from
his concern for what the tradition has tenned "ontology."
To simplify matters a great deal, Heidegger can be seen
as challenging the entire sense of being-the entire
sense and experience of what it means to say that
something or someone "is"-which has come to
predominate in the West. Beginning with the ancient
Greeks, and progressing until the present time, we have
overemphasized "presence" and transparency as a
model for comprebension, while underemphasizing and
even castigating absence and opacity. But while the
Greeks valorized the clear and manifest purity of fonn
(Plato) or the triumphant sway of the actual (Aristotle),
for us today the Western thirst for presence takes the
shape of a demand for objectivity in modern sciencethe status of being an object laid out for view by a
(human) subject-and availability as a resource (and
ultimately as a consumable inventory) in modem
technology. Heidegger argues, then, that what counts
for us as something that "is" is the scientific object and
the technological stockpile.
In order to count for us today as having being-that
is, as being something that is at all extant-an entity
must be secured as either an object of scientific
knowledge or, better yet, as a stored "resource" on call
for eventual consumption or further production.
Moreover, Heidegger sees this modern ontology as the
outcome of a virtually inexorable progression that
begins with the ancient Greeks: starting with Plato's
vision of purely intelligible and eternally unchanging
fonns (that is, being as completely present and always
present) and Aristotle's emphasis on actuality (that is,
being as present as well in this and that entity), Western
thought and existence has emphasized presence at the
expense of absence. Against this, Heidegger maintains
that the character of presence is not exhaustive of being,
that absence and withdrawal and opacity are characters
of being that are not only equiprimordial with presence
but even possess a certain priority. The Greek word,
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of technology and its ontological ambitions to bring
entities into unhiddenness as stock and resource-not
atavistically abandoning technology but letting-go of
its compulsiveness and seductiveness, its claims to offer
notjust convenience but revelation and salvation-such
a letting-go is a letting-be of entities: not a neglect or
ignoring of them Gust letting them alone) buta positive
allowing of entities to be what they are, a clearing of
space for beings to reveal themselves of their own
accord, as well as to make manifest their resistance to
total manifestation.
Such a comportment toward entities, as a manner
of being-in-the-world amidst entities, can be
characterized as a mode of inhabiting the world. And
Heidegger maintains that this sense of a mode of
inhabitation is in fact the primal and primary meaning
of ethics, beginning with the Greek word ethos which
derived its sense of "custom," "habit," and "character"
from its earlier meanings of "accustomed place," and
abode. Heidegger, then, opens up a new space for ethical
thought by thinking ethics as ethos, i.e., as mode of
dwelling or inhabitation, and by thinking Gelassenheit
(releasement or letting-be) as a mode of what he calls
in the "Letter on Humanism" "primal" or "original
ethics," Le., a dwelling or primary mode of comportment so basic that it would precede the distinction of
theory and practice, and hence be as much a knowing
as a doing-and vice versa. The most basic question of
ethics is the question of how it is that we are to inhabit
the world, the question of how we are to comport
ourselves within the world-whether our primary
bearing in relation to entities is to be one of self-assertive
will to control and domination or one of pause and
listening and letting-be.

foundations on the basis of which entities would be
measured and judged, are both principal maneuvers of
what Heidegger disavows as the "subjectivity" ofmodem
thought which aims to master and dominate what it
encounters. What is needed, rather, is a thoughtful
dwelling in the midst of thmgs, not the detachment of
theoria which would set them up as objects-and
ultimately, he argues, as resources.
Second, we should also note that after the political
fiasco of his university rectorship during the early
thirties, Heidegger refrained from making public
pronouncements on specific social and moral issues,
preferring instead to engage his thinking with issues at
a more radical level of inquiry. In my view, this was a
wise and happy decision, for it has served to free his
thought from the stodgy, conservative, and provincial
limits of his own biography and psychological
makeup--a freeing which usually accrues to the work
of major thinkers only after greater passage of time
(think of the near century it took for Nietzsche's thought
to come into its own) or a violent reshaping (think of
the appropriation of Hegel by the Young Hegeleans and
Marx). But at the same time, Heidegger's restraint puts
us (as it should) on our own in exploring its practical
implications. For better or worse Heidegger himself
offers us as many specific prescriptions on how we
should treat animals as he does on how we should treat
other people, and that is precisely none at all.
This being said, we can with some caution
extrapolate what we could term an onto-ethical
imperative that is implicit in Heidegger's work, and
even more cautiously, we could formulate it along the
following lines: in our thinking, and speaking, and
acting, to allow to those entities with which we concern
ourselves those modes of coming-into-presence, as well
as self-witholding and withdrawal, that they would show
forth of their own accord. Parallel to St. Paul, Heidegger
would seem to be telling us: "LET BE, and do what
thou will." And like Kant, he would seem to be implying
that we should treat always at the same time as an end
and never merely as a means, but with an important
difference, for the Heideggerean injunction would not
be limited to persons-indeed, it would not even be
limited to sentient beings-but would extend to entities
as a whole. Heidegger enjoins us explicitly to "save the
earth," Le., in the face of modern technology and its
subjugation of the planet to the status of gas station and
warehouse, to allow entities to retain and reassert their
darkness and density and reticence to disclosure, their

n. A Heideggerean Ethic of Dwelling, Saving, and
Letting-be, and Its Implications
for Our Treatment of Animals
What implications would this have, then, for the
question of how human beings ought to treat animals?
How would this kind of thinking, were it to be embraced,
alter our practices toward animals? Before dealing with
this question, two brief qualifications are in order. First,
we are not justified in expecting from Heidegger an
ethical "theory" which we could then straightforwardly
"apply" as a theoretical foundation for specific mM ll
judgments. That distance which thought would assume
over against a world of objects, and that positing of
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instance. The food and apparel industries, as well as
the mass use of animals in laboratories, are especially
well-suited to illustrating the grim and uncanny power
of technology as a manner of revealing entities and as a
mode of comportment toward them: through these
practices we can see most vividly what it means to say
that technology violates the earthy self reserve, and
hence the very nature, of beings over which it holds
sway. Had we time today, a Heideggerean gloss (chapter
by chapter) of Peter Singer's Animal Liberation would
be most appropriate! What it would show, I believe, is
that the impact of that book comes not primarily from
the terrible animal suffering that it documents, for as
critics such as J. Baird Callicott have been quick to note,
animals suffer terribly in the wild as well. What is
uniquely compelling in Singer's careful documentation
of the technological processing of living beings is
precisely the ontological horror which grips the reader,
in the face of that very technological processing of life.
Why is it that the suffering of the anemic and immobile
veal calves induces in us a deep revulsion which all the
combined PBS nature-show footage of predators tearing
apart their prey could never come close to generating?
Is it just the fact that humans, and not wolves or raptors,
are in this case the agents of suffering and death? Or is
it not more akin to the horror first evoked by Mary
Shelley's novel, the horror at life usurped, mechanized,
and appropriated-yet in this case without the frenzy
of demented genius but, rather, arising from a
comportment which takes upon itself nothing more
demonic than the dull patina of business as usual and,
thus, is all the more horrible.
Singer presents us with visions that provoke our
outrage. He shows us, for example, vast, dimly lighted
sheds with tens of thousands of chickens packed so tightly
together in cages (as many as four or even five birds per
square foot) that they are nearly immobile, and with all
oftheir natural urges so entirely frustrated that they would
turn to cannibalism were their beaks not already removed.
If such practices resulted from negligence, or savage
cruelty, we could at least understand them as deriving
from human personality disorders, but in fact they are
often the norm and result from openly espoused positions
such as one that Singer cites from a British agronomy
journal: "The modem layer is, after all, only a very
efficient converting machine, changing the raw
material-feedingstuffs-intothe fmished product-the
egg-less, ofcourse, maintenance requirements" (Animal
Liberation, p. 103). Even more appalling are visions of

"earthliness," as he puts it. In a technological age,

Gelassenheit is above all a letting-be of the earthly.
"Earth" is for Heidegger not just, or even primarily,
a planet in cosmic space, but rather the locus of closure
and self-seclusion that Western metaphysics-and
modern science and ~echnology, to the extent that they
are metaphysical successors-has tried to dominate.
Earth is for each entity that element from which it
emerges into appearance, and into which it continually
withdraws. It is not only the "ground" in the literal sense
of"soil" but also that which in every instance engenders
what emerges: the earth is precisely that from which
self-emergence arises, into which it continually
withdraws, and which withholds and preserves the
possibility of both. Viewed phenomenologically, it is
the solidity of a colored object which can support a play
of light and color only because of its very density and
which can present one side of itself only by withholding
another side from view. The earth is not only that in
which plants take root and upon which houses are built
but also human and animal bodies, the sound of a spoken
word or the script of a written text, the bronze or clay
which upholds a sculpted surface. In each case, the earth
is what bears and gives rise to what comes to light only
by remaining intrinsically dark itself. Earth is that which
shelters and supports, "the serving bearer, blossoming
and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up
into plant and animal" (Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling,
Thinking," p. 149). To save the earth is to allow to each
and every entity the grounds for its own self-emergence.
But this reticent self-emergence is the very phenomenon
which, according to Heidegger, the early Greeks called
physis! To save the earth, then, is to allow to each entity
its "nature" in both dominant senses of the concept,
"nature": both its characteristic way-to-be, and also its
naturalness in emerging from itself, rather than
emerging solely as the work of artifice or production.
The mode of self-emergence of certain kinds of entities,
however, is of special interest to us, attracting and
arresting our attention. In zoe, which we translate as
"life," physis displays an intensified self-emerging, one
that is not only a self-unfolding but also a self-opening
that enters into the open alongside us.
But what then, specifically, about animals? Should
we eat them? Or wear them? Or experiment on them?
Or not? When these questions are juxtaposed alongside
Heidegger's thoughts of "the earthly" and "selfemergence," the ontological violence of technological
domination is brought to light as in almost no other
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consistent answer, deriving from Heidegger's approach,
is: given the way we typically go about doing these
things, no! One of the most notable features of Singer's
book is its effectiveness in demonstrating how trivial
are the gains to be obtained by all this suffering and
horror: how trivial the experimental results, how petty
the decrease in the cost of eggs, how easily more decent
methods could be implemented. This is not only material
for a utilitarian calculus: perhaps more importantly, it
is significant evidence that Heidegger is right in his
claim (reiterated recently by Thomas Berry in his book,
The Dream of the Eanh) that we are bewitched and
enchanted by modem technology, that we look to it for
our salvation, that efficiency and domination and control
are pursued blindly at any cost, and right that we need
to let go of this obsession.
But what about gentler, more merciful ways of
raising animals or more intelligent and significant and
compassionate experiments than really might teach us
something? Here is where, I believe, Heidegger leaves
us on our own. We are, let us now grant, to let animals
be, allow them to enter into the full display of their
own ways to be, let them come into appearance from
themselves, without betraying their inherent selfwithholding. Who, then, lets them be, and who does
not? Not the agribusiness entrepreneur nor the glib
researcher nor even the administrators at my own
College who remove alligators from the ponds when
they reach a certain size, for to let an alligator "be" is
surely to let it be .,. dangerous. But I see no way, from
Heidegger's point of view, to maintain that no human
use of animals lets them be. On the contrary, the reverent
and risky right of passage in which a Native American
youth procures an eagle feather seems to me to let the
eagle show forth its own splendor just as much as does
the awe of the Audobon Society observer. That we are
at long last replenishing some of our wild areas with
wolves seems to be a most wonderful letting-be of
canine physis but so, too, is the very evident zest and
exuberance with which a dog performs extraordinary
tricks for its trainer. Heidegger leaves us here to work
out our relation to animals historically, as our own wayto-be unfolds alongside theirs, and relative to our own
cultural sensibilities and intuitions, and, of course, our
customs regarding cruelty and compassion. What I have
called his onto-ethical imperative is, it seems to me,
capable of many sorts of elaborations, and it is in this
sense that I believe it is meaningful to say that Heidegger
is an historicist.

laboratory studies and experiments in which mammals,
and often primates, are coolly tortured to death or driven
mad for the sake of fmdings so trivial that they possess
utterly no interest for anything more than idle curiositylabs in which, as one horrified reporter put it, "the life of
an animal has no meaning beyond the immediate purpose
of experimentation" (Ibid., p. 63). "How," Singer asks,
"can these things happen? How can a man who is not a
sadist spend his working day heating an unanesthetized
dog to death, or driving a monkey into a lifelong
depression, and then remove his white coat, wash his
hands, and go home to dinner with his wife and children?"
(Ibid., p. 62).
Given Heidegger's critiques of modem science and
technology, it is perhaps not saying enough to say that
such practices are "wrong." Rather, they give us
glimpses into the outer extremities of an ontological
errancy become so total that it has lost touch entirely
with any innocence in the face of being-has severed
itself from any sense of delight in the self-emergence
of the natural-so obsessed has it become with
efficiency, and control, and explanation. What
Heidegger allows us to see is that it is not enough to
say, in good utilitarian fashion, that such practices result
in needless pain for sentient sufferers. What, then,
should be said, if it is not enough to say that such things
are "wrong"? Already I have suggested that for
Heidegger such things are "horrifying." But what is the
horrifying? According to Heidegger, "the Horrifying
[das Entsetzende] is that which sets 'everything that
is' outside of what was formerly its own way-to-be
[Wesen or "nature" in the frrst sense noted above] "("The
Thing," p. 166). Technology (whether in the laboratory
or the factory fann or the totalitarian state or the modem
war machine) sets upon entities to set them up as
resources and raw materials, which it then sets in order
for consumption and further production. But this is at
the same time horrifying: "everything thatis"-people,
animals, lands and seas, subatomic particles and genetic
codes-gets "set outside of," displaced from, or stripped
of what was before this its own mode of self-emergence,
its very nature. (For those who have not read Singer's
book, I can relay to you that his discussion of Harlow's
experiments on primates with maternal deprivationcomplete with "monster mothers" who brutalize and
murder their trusting charges-raises horror to levels
usually attained only in the cinema.)
What about the animals? Should we eat them? Or
wear them? Or experiment on them? I think the only
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justice requires is not a so-called promotion of animals
to human status but adefacto demotion of human beings
to animal status. But in that case, demands for racial
justice (viz., demands to be accorded as fully human)
would become incoherent.
Finally, taken simply as an empirical claim, it is
questionable to state that class identity (I mean here,
of course, ontical and logical class) precludes
mistreatment. On the contrary, civil wars are typically
more merciless than wars between nations; gang
violence (generally between members of the same
race, socio-economic group, and neighborhood) is
unusually brutal; and domestic violence (Le. within
the family, where group identity is at its highest and
least controversial) often reaches alarming intensity
and, in fact, accounts for a large portion of all violence
in society.
To say simply that people are animals is, I believe,
of no necessary help to the animals themselves. Yet
neither I-nor, I think, Heidegger-would maintain
an utter discontinuity. I experience both within myself
as well as without that physis rises up always out of
the darkness of earth. In both cases it commands
respect if I allow it to be what it is, and it is just this
letting-be that Gelassenheit prescribes. And I do not
see how it is possible to respect this within, yet not
without-Dr vice versa.
So, in summary:
Against the Western view that explicability and
calculability are the salient characters of the real,
Heidegger maintains that more primary is a selfconcealing and self-withdrawing character, Le.. that
being is better grasped as also inherently "mysterious"
than as purely intelligible. He understands nature not
solely as mechanism but in terms of the Greek physis
or "self-witholding self-emergence," that which come
forth and recedes of its own accord, and understands
life as zoe, "intensified self-emergence." The
attunement to this sense of being engenders respect
and even reverence for living things. Such an
attunement is not unlike the relation of many
indigenous peoples, such as Native Americans, to both
domestic and wild animals: even when their treatment
of animals is harsh, it is never lacking in respect for
the mystery that is at play in all life. Yet Heidegger
arrives at this position from a critique of Western
thought and practice that is entirely immanent and,
hence, accessible to us in ways that non-Western views
may never be.

III. Does It Take an Animal to Be Good to One?

'.

There is, however, a final issue to be confronted
concerning the bearing of Heidegger's thought on our
treatment of animals. Contrary to most environmentalists and animal right activists, who feel that it
is important to see humanity as an animal species,
Heidegger rejects human animality altogether. And
contrary to an even larger number, rather than seeing
human beings as simply component parts of nature,
he sees them as those beings through whom (but not
necessarily, I want to add immediately,for the sake of
whom) nature comes to light and emerges into
presence. Since Heidegger has come under some
recent criticism for these views, it seems worthwhile
to pose the question explicitly: is there a clear and
direct relationship, as it is often assumed, between how
we treat animals and whether-or the extent to
which-we see ourselves as animals?
To respect and/or treat well members of class L, it
is held, one must oneself be-Dr see oneself as-a
member of L. But from this, it would follow that to
respect the French, I would need to be French as well;
to treat babies well and respect thein, I would have to
be a baby (or at least see myself as one); to respect
works of art or treat them well, I must myself be a work
of art, and so on for shop tools, African violets, or
Siamese cats and Bengal tigers. But since this is so
clearly absurd, we must ask why this kind of assumption
prevails at all. Surely there must be some other
reasoning underlying this widespread claim and belief.
There are grounds for believing that it has evolved
from a peculiar extension of thinking about interracial
justice. (Indeed, Aldo Leopold-patron of deep
ecology- draws heavily on this analogy). If I deny to
members of other races the status of being human, then
I am likely (indeed, certain!) to mistreat them. And the
same goes, it might be said, for my beliefs about
members of other species: if I deny an identity with
them, then here, too, it seems I will be prone to mistreat
them-and in fact, as would be the case with my beliefs
about other races, the suspicion would arise that my
beliefis held precisely in order to justify my mistreating
them. But this only seems to make sense. Members of
other races precisely are human and deserving of
whatever any human deserves, while animals simply
are not human and in fact represent in the analogy just
that status which it would be wrong to accord members
of other races. It could, of course, be argued that what
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